So here we are dissecting James Wirtz piece in TV Paul's book on balance of power. If there is an underlying thread which runs through the length and breath of this chapter, it is the title itself: the Balance of Power Paradox. But before thinking about the main points which need to be covered in this chapter, there are two definitional issues which needs clarification. I am thinking that not all of you understand (notwithstanding the fact that there are many brilliant minds out there which I duly acknowledge) completely the idea of deterrence and more so of compellence. Also, as you glance through the chapter, you will realise that these two aspects are integral to understanding Wirtz. And since, the motive behind the exercise of writing this blog is to make you understand and not frighten you with definitional purity and jargons, I am going to give you a layman's idea and elaborate upon the difference between these two.
Deterrence and compellence first of all are strategies for achieving your desired goals given you have certain resources (In simple words, given resources, strategy allows you to achieve certain goals). Now when essential interests of two states are divergent, there is bound to be some kind of conflict. In other words, the objectives of antagonistic parties are mutually exclusive. How do you then go about achieving your desired goals? There is where deterrence and compellence become important.
In the case of deterrence, state A asks state B not to do something which it might otherwise do. In simple terms, A is asking B for inaction on her part. This is achieved by two processes. Either you threaten B with huge punishment if she proceeds with her actions or you make B realise that her actions would not fetch her any meaningful gains. The first is called deterrence by punishment and second is characterised as deterrence by defence.
Compellence, on the other hand, is a little complicated. Why? Because unlike deterrence, where A is asking B not to do something, in case of compellence A demands B to do something which it would have not done otherwise. So if deterrence is about negative action on part of B, compellence is about forcing B to undertake positive action.
Two examples, one from quotidian life and other from the world of international relations will help understand the concepts better. Consider you sharing a room with one of your unruly siblings. And since you are quiet studious and your sibling is not, you feel disturbed by her presence. Your goal is to complete your readings without being perturbed by the presence of your brother or sister. You have two ways to do it. You can either ask her to keep quite or otherwise you will call your parents (negative action demanded hence deterrence by punishment) or ask her to leave the room immediately or otherwise be ready to face the music (compellence). In the first case you are asking her not to do something (not to make noise without asking her to leave); in the second case, you demand her to leave the room itself or face your wrath (positive action demanded hence compellence).
Moving closer to the world of international relations, apply this to the idea of two states A and B. Suppose B sponsors terrorism inside the territory of A. What can A do to stop B fomenting trouble in her country? Logic of deterrence would suggest that A will ask B not to support terrorism otherwise A will invade B (simple deterrence by punishment). Compellence on the other hand would involve A asking B not only to stop abetting terrorism but also to punish terrorists who were involved in any previous terrorist incident (this involves positive action on B's part: compelling B to do something which it would have not done otherwise).
So now let us comeback to the Balance of Power Paradox.
1) Explain what is the paradox in the first place? The puzzle for Wirtz emanates from the fact that even when both the balance of power theorists and hegemonic stability theorists predict peace, whenever there occurs a balance of power or hegemonic rule in world systems, wars take place between strong and weak states. If balances of power and hegemonic rule provide stability, as both models claim to be the case, why wars occur between weak and strong states?
2) Flowing from the first, what incentives the balance of power system provides weak states to challenge strong states? And also vice versa: why strong states, who in a balance of power system should not be concerned about weak states, fight such wars? Wirtz discusses Kenneth Waltz predictions in this regard and explains the contradictions within Neorealism when it comes to explaining the paradox. In some sense, the structure is providing incentives for both aggressive and non-aggressive behaviour. Discuss this.
3) Why the paradox produces war? Clearly if the system is indeterminate, there must be something else working behind the scenes. Wirtz is talking about how leaders perceive systemic constraints. It is an important point. Also discuss why deterrence and compellent strategies, which should theoretically work under balance of power systems, fail under the influence of the paradox.
4) Discuss the two case studies - Vietnam and Iraq - bearing in mind the essential argument which Wirtz is trying to put forward. Does the evidence supports his claims? What was the calculation of weak states and how did the strong states perceived the conflict? What balance of power has to do with such perceptions? Please also discuss why deterrence and compellence failed in both of these cases.
Think about some of these issues.
Deterrence and compellence first of all are strategies for achieving your desired goals given you have certain resources (In simple words, given resources, strategy allows you to achieve certain goals). Now when essential interests of two states are divergent, there is bound to be some kind of conflict. In other words, the objectives of antagonistic parties are mutually exclusive. How do you then go about achieving your desired goals? There is where deterrence and compellence become important.
In the case of deterrence, state A asks state B not to do something which it might otherwise do. In simple terms, A is asking B for inaction on her part. This is achieved by two processes. Either you threaten B with huge punishment if she proceeds with her actions or you make B realise that her actions would not fetch her any meaningful gains. The first is called deterrence by punishment and second is characterised as deterrence by defence.
Compellence, on the other hand, is a little complicated. Why? Because unlike deterrence, where A is asking B not to do something, in case of compellence A demands B to do something which it would have not done otherwise. So if deterrence is about negative action on part of B, compellence is about forcing B to undertake positive action.
Two examples, one from quotidian life and other from the world of international relations will help understand the concepts better. Consider you sharing a room with one of your unruly siblings. And since you are quiet studious and your sibling is not, you feel disturbed by her presence. Your goal is to complete your readings without being perturbed by the presence of your brother or sister. You have two ways to do it. You can either ask her to keep quite or otherwise you will call your parents (negative action demanded hence deterrence by punishment) or ask her to leave the room immediately or otherwise be ready to face the music (compellence). In the first case you are asking her not to do something (not to make noise without asking her to leave); in the second case, you demand her to leave the room itself or face your wrath (positive action demanded hence compellence).
Moving closer to the world of international relations, apply this to the idea of two states A and B. Suppose B sponsors terrorism inside the territory of A. What can A do to stop B fomenting trouble in her country? Logic of deterrence would suggest that A will ask B not to support terrorism otherwise A will invade B (simple deterrence by punishment). Compellence on the other hand would involve A asking B not only to stop abetting terrorism but also to punish terrorists who were involved in any previous terrorist incident (this involves positive action on B's part: compelling B to do something which it would have not done otherwise).
So now let us comeback to the Balance of Power Paradox.
1) Explain what is the paradox in the first place? The puzzle for Wirtz emanates from the fact that even when both the balance of power theorists and hegemonic stability theorists predict peace, whenever there occurs a balance of power or hegemonic rule in world systems, wars take place between strong and weak states. If balances of power and hegemonic rule provide stability, as both models claim to be the case, why wars occur between weak and strong states?
2) Flowing from the first, what incentives the balance of power system provides weak states to challenge strong states? And also vice versa: why strong states, who in a balance of power system should not be concerned about weak states, fight such wars? Wirtz discusses Kenneth Waltz predictions in this regard and explains the contradictions within Neorealism when it comes to explaining the paradox. In some sense, the structure is providing incentives for both aggressive and non-aggressive behaviour. Discuss this.
3) Why the paradox produces war? Clearly if the system is indeterminate, there must be something else working behind the scenes. Wirtz is talking about how leaders perceive systemic constraints. It is an important point. Also discuss why deterrence and compellent strategies, which should theoretically work under balance of power systems, fail under the influence of the paradox.
4) Discuss the two case studies - Vietnam and Iraq - bearing in mind the essential argument which Wirtz is trying to put forward. Does the evidence supports his claims? What was the calculation of weak states and how did the strong states perceived the conflict? What balance of power has to do with such perceptions? Please also discuss why deterrence and compellence failed in both of these cases.
Think about some of these issues.
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